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Abstract. Social capital is widely recognized as one of the few sources of capital available to the
poor, yet the processes by which development policies a¡ect the accumulation of that social capital
are not well understood. The World Bank, through its funding of development projects, a¡ects the
institutional environments for the accumulation of such social capital. The question is how to
determine whether that institutional context is enabling, and to what degree. This paper compares
ten recent World Bank-funded rural development projects in Mexico and the Philippines to explore
how the processes of project design and implementation in£uence the institutional environments
for the accumulation of horizontal, vertical, and intersectoral forms of pro-poor social capital. The
¢ndings have conceptual and policy implications for understanding the political dynamics of
creating enabling environments for social capital accumulation by the poor.
Introduction
Social capital is increasingly recognized by students and practitioners of devel-
opment as a critical resource of the poor. How development interventions can
shape the processes of social capital accumulation in ways that empower the
poor (what we call pro-poor social capital) is therefore an important intellec-
tual and practical challenge. Foreign aid organizations can rarely directly
intervene in the local-level processes of social capital accumulation and/or
decay. They can in£uence, however, the broader policy environments under
which development projects and programs are designed and implemented, in
ways that can either facilitate or obstruct processes of pro-poor social capital
accumulation.
As the world's largest intergovernmental organization concerned with
poverty alleviation, the World Bank, through its projects, can make or break
social capital. Much is known about its potential negative impact, but its recent
wave of social and environmental policy reforms now make possible positive
contributions to social capital accumulation as well. These policy reforms
include an important emphasis on public participation and good governance ^
both critical for e¡ectively tapping social capital's development potential. The
process of translating policies into institutional practice has been quite uneven
so far, however, which raises the question: what are the institutional conditions
that make it possible for World Bank projects to contribute to social capital
accumulation?
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This study is based on the following propositions: ¢rst, since money is
power, development aid inherently a¡ects the distribution of power within
states and societies.World Bank funds £ow to states, and the paths they follow
a¡ect the balance of power between agencies and factions within the public
sector. These funds are in turn invested in ways that a¡ect the balance of power
within civil society, either encouraging or discouraging development pathways
that are more or less conducive to accumulation of social capital by the poor.
This chapter examines the ways in which the policy process a¡ects horizontal
social capital on the ground, as well as how this policy process is in turn
in£uenced by intersectoral social capital that bridges social and institutional
divides. The processes are analyzed here by assessing the degree to whichWorld
Bank projects contribute to enabling institutional environments for both of
these kinds of social capital, based on comparative ¢eld studies of ten recent
rural development projects in Mexico and the Philippines. These empirical data
lead to a set of ¢ndings that address the intellectual challenge of understanding
processes of social capital accumulation as well as the policy implications,
concluding with some observations on how policymakers can use social capital
as a policy resource.
TheWorld Bank and social capital
It is given that some kinds of social capital contribute to economic and institu-
tional development (Putnam, 1993; Evans, 1997). For the purposes of this
study, social capital encompasses those social relationships that facilitate
collective action in the public interest. Such ties constitute resources that help
to overcome obstacles to collective action both within and between groups.
These linkages are especially valuable for underrepresented social groups that
have few power resources other than their capacity for collective action. This
kind of `positive' social capital is widely associated with social norms of trust
and reciprocity. The de¢nition used here does not con£ate the norms with
the ties, nor does it assume that one drives the other. Most likely they are
mutually constitutive. Intersectoral social capital facilitates cooperation be-
tween distinct groups, overcoming boundaries between ethnic groups, or across
the institutional divides between civil society, the state, and the World Bank
(Brown, 1991; Brown and Ashman, 1996; Brown and Fox, 1998; Woolcock and
Narayan, 2000).
In spite of the concept's increasing presence and legitimacy at the World
Bank, its use is still largely limited to conceptual discussion among researchers.
Some analysts are beginning to make the connection between the intellectual
recognition of social capital's potential contribution and the Bank's institu-
tional policies and actions. One essay concludes by signaling four areas for
action (Grootaert, 1997). The ¢rst recommendation is: `Do Your Homework,
Do No Harm.' Such assessments would prevent projects from weakening existing
positive social capital, and suggest ways to strengthen it. The second recom-
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mendation is to: `Use Local-Level Social Capital to Deliver Projects.' This
suggestion underscores existing Bank mandates on NGO collaboration (Covey,
1998; OED, 1999; Nelson, 1995). The third suggestion is to `Create Enabling
Environments.' In other words, `The scope for e¡ective use and strengthening of
social capital depends critically on the nature of the wider political and policy
environment.' This is a newer, suggestion, though not often linked to the Bank's
separate discourse on `good governance' (World Bank, 1997d). The fourth
recommendation is to `Invest in Social Capital,' which means supporting `exist-
ing and emerging organizations.' This chapter will assess the degree to which
ten recent and ongoing projects apply these ideas in practice.
The question of the impact of World Bank projects on poor people's social
capital is quite broad, especially if one were to include indirect e¡ects of macro-
economic adjustment operations. For example, adjustment-related increases in
unemployment could be linked to breakdowns in community social cohesion,
gender, or ethnic con£ict, as well as directly dismantling social capital em-
bodied in trade unions. In Fiscal 1999, adjustment loans accounted for the
majority of Bank lending for the ¢rst time. This study pursues a more narrow
approach, operationalizing the general question by focusing only on loans that
directly involved the institutional environments for existing rural poor peoples'
economic development organizations. Drawing on Grootaert's framework, the
study's focus is on whether the Bank projects avoided harm, designed projects
to tap existing social capital, contributed to enabling institutional environ-
ments, and invested directly in existing social capital. Even in cases where `pro-
social capital' projects have been attempted, it turns out that the obstacles to
pro-poor social capital accumulation are signi¢cant. Many within both the
World Bank and borrowing governments remain indi¡erent, skeptical, or even
directly opposed to `pro-social capital' policies and projects. The broader in-
tellectual and policy challenge, therefore, is to explain the conditions under
which these obstacles are overcome.
This study is based on the proposition that theWorld Bank, national govern-
ments, and civil societies are divided on the issue of whether and how to
promote the consolidation of poor people's social capital. This proposition is
based on prior empirical research on the Bank's reform process (Fox and
Brown, 1998; Kardam, 1993; Thorne, 1998;Wade, 1997). Based on this assump-
tion of intra-institutional heterogeneity, this study will focus on the conditions
under which pro-social capital actors in each of these three policy arenas
(Bank, state, society) manage to form e¡ective pro-reform partnerships.
Analytical framework
This study suggests that the most direct impact of postreform World Bank
projects on social capital development depends on whether or not the projects
contribute to the consolidation of an enabling environment. In practice, the
working hypothesis is that this process depends on the convergence of three
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sets of actors. Projects must: be supported at the international level by World
Bank actors willing to invest resources (political as well as economic) on
promoting an enabling environment for social capital development; at the
governmental level, be designed to support agencies that are already controlled
by policymakers who favor balanced partnerships with broad-based social
organizations; and be designed to target sectors and regions where pro-
participation civil society stakeholders have the capacity to act in support of
reform policy implementation. The hypothesized corollary is that if any of these
three pro-reform actors are not involved in the project process, reform imple-
mentation is likely to fall short. This hypothesis was generated from previous
¢eld research on theWorld Bank's antipoverty projects (Fox and Aranda, 1996)
and sustainable development policy reforms (Fox and Brown, 1998). The ap-
proach is compatible with the Operations Evaluation Department ¢ndings on
NGO collaboration with the World Bank, which also highlights both enabling
environments and intersectoral relationships (OED, 1999). There are two princi-
pal di¡erences, however. First, this study focuses on membership organizations
while OED dealt mainly with NGOs. Second, while the OED study refers to a
general notion of `close working relationships' (OED, 1999, pp. 15¡), this study
attempts to develop more precise indicators of such relationships, and of the
speci¢c policies that facilitate such relationships. For the OED study, close
intersectoral relationships are a cause of positive development outcomes. This
study, in contrast, treats such relationships as the result of compliance with key
Bank mandates and participatory project goals. This relates to a broader issue
in the social capital literature: is trust the foundation of social capital, or does
the process of generating social capital create the relations of trust? Clearly this
is a reciprocal process. OED is currently carrying out a study of participation in
Bank-funded projects that will be relevant for assessing the ¢ndings presented
here.
The basic point is quite straightforward: putting reforms into practice that
expand opportunities for pro-poor social capital accumulation requires balanced
multisectoral coalitions to o¡set inevitable opposition.
Drawing on Woolcock and Narayan's conceptual framework (2000), three
di¡erent kinds of social capital turn out to be involved:
à Horizontal. Local, horizontal social capital constitutes the basic building
block for grassroots action. This kind of social capital is di¤cult for
Bank-funded projects to create where it is absent, but easy for Bank-
funded projects to destroy where it is present (most directly, through large
infrastructure projects).
à Scaled up, horizontally and vertically.When local horizontal groups form
ties with other base groups to form networks and federations, the vertical
and horizontal ties between them may be weaker than intragroup ties, but
they play a critical role in terms of generating bargaining power vis-a© -vis
other actors (Esman and Upho¡, 1984; Fox, 1992; Granovetter, 1973). This
kind of social capital is more susceptible to consolidation in response to
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the institutional environment, taking into account freedom of association
and participatory policy innovations.
à Intersectoral social capital. In order for national and international policy-
makers to promote institutional innovations that create enabling environ-
ments for grassroots social capital on the ground, intersectoral social
capital between diverse coalition partners needs to be created and con-
solidated (Brown, 1991; Brown and Ashman, 1996).
While it is certainly di¤cult for Bank or state managers to promote
local social capital where it is absent, they can promote social capital
between themselves and with existing poor people's organizations, in
order to promote the horizontal spread and vertical scaling-up of existing
grassroots social capital.
Comparative approach
This study uses a comparative approach, including both cross-national/cross-
regional and subnational comparisons.While the Philippines and Mexico di¡er
greatly in terms of their political regimes, the key variables in the proposed
explanation of `pro-social capital' outcomes do not depend on national regime
type. The World Bank has also sustained strong partnerships with both states
over the long term, independent of regime changes (e.g., Bello, 1983; Broad,
1988; Cruz, Cornista and Dayan, 1987; Fox, 2001; Korten and Siy, 1989).
The ¢eld research generated a detailed data set on the institutional dynamics
of ten postreform rural anti-poverty and `green' projects (Fox and Gershman,
1999). (See Table 1 for a description of the projects and their objectives.) To
focus analysis on those cases where at least partial reform was possible, the
project cases were chosen based on two criteria. First, all were designed under
the mandate of the World Bank's social and environmental policy reforms.
Second, all the projects were in sectors or regions where some degree of
consolidated social capital already existed, in the form of broad-based rural
grassroots organizations and experienced development NGOs. Projects vary
in terms of which government agency is supported (politically as well as eco-
nomically) by aWorld Bank loan; this leads to variation in terms of the second
variable. In terms of the third variable, project implementation also varies
across diverse regions within each country. Geographic regions targeted range
from those with consolidated, broad-based organizations of the rural poor to
areas where dense social capital is lacking.
Case research focused on the design phase of each project. The design
process for investment projects, especially in environmentally sensitive areas,
usually takes several years, creating a rich record for research and analysis. The
political dynamics of project design also signi¢cantly shape those of implemen-
tation.TheWorld Bank reforms that guide the project design process include its
environmental assessment policy (1989, revised in 1991), its public information
disclosure policy (1994), and its indigenous people's policy (1982, revised in
177
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Table 1. O¤cial goals of ten post-world bank reform rural development projects.
Projects O¤cial goals
Philippines
Protected areas (1994) Provide program support for the development, conservation and manage-
ment of resources with 10 priority sites under the Government's
National Integrated Protected Area System (SAR, p. 16)
Second rural ¢nance (1995) Expand .. . commercial credit to agriculture and rural development and
enhance the framework of the rural ¢nancial sector by ¢nancing private
sector investments in rural areas, strengthen the Land Bank, and upgrad-
ing the operating capacity of rural cooperatives and participating ¢nan-
cial institutions . . . (SAR, p. 15)
Agrarian reform
communities (1996)
Provide support services for agrarian reform bene¢ciaries through institu-
tional development of membership organizations, agricultural enterprise
development and rural infrastructure (SAR, p. 20)
Community-based resource
management (1997)
Reduce rural poverty and environmental degradation through support
for locally-generated and implemented natural resource management
projects (SAR, p. 2)
Social fund (1998) Increase the access of the population in the poor and most con£ict-
a¡ected areas of the Special Zone of Peace and Development to basic
economic and social infrastructure, services and employment opportuni-
ties (SAR, p. 9)
Mexico
Rainfed areas development
(1994)
To raise agricultural productivity in selected rainfed areas [and] to give
additional emphasis to the creation of producer organizations . . . (PID,
pp. 1^2)
Rural ¢nancial markets
(1996)
To augment the participation of rural entrepreneurs in rural ¢nancial
markets, especially of the poor .. . [and] to demonstrate that it is possible
to supply ¢nancial services to small and micro-entrepreneurs in small
rural localities ^ in a sustainable manner (SAR, p. 3)
Aquaculture (1997) Promote sustainable aquaculture development by increasing the produc-
tivity of the aquaculture sector within a framework of social consensus
and environmental soundness [by assisting] the government in completing
and implementing its regulatory framework .. . provide key public
goods and support productive investments and training for social
sector producers and develop a more level playing ¢eld for social
sector participation (SAR, p. 13)
Community forestry (1997) Designed to empower the communities and ejidos in their decision-
making as to the nature, extent and timing of the training and technical
assistance on sustainable forestry management they would receive (SAR,
p. 21)
Rural development in
marginal areas (1997)
Improve the well-being and income of smallholder in about 24 targeted
marginal areas . . . fostering community socio-economic development,
organization and participation (PAD, p. 2)
Each statement quotes the o¤cial project document (formerly called Sta¡ Appraisal Report, more
recently called Project Appraisal Document). Since all of these loans were signed after 1994, they are
subject to the information disclosure policy and are therefore available at the World Bank's Public
Information Center.
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1991). All these policies are designed to promote informed participation by key
stakeholders in the design as well as the implementation of projects.
Each project design process was analyzed in terms of the degree and the
nature of implementation of each of the World Bank's pro-social capital key
policy process reforms. The analysis is based on a series of measurable indica-
tors drawn from the o¤cial policies themselves.
Indicators of institutional preconditions for informed participation
This study focuses on some of the institutional changes that contribute to an
enabling environment for social capital. The ¢rst three indicators detailed below
highlight the fundamental role of opportunities for informed public participa-
tion. The fourth indicator assesses intersectoral coalition building to promote
these institutional changes. Each project was rated on a scale from zero to low,
medium, or high, according to each indicator. The ¢rst indicator focuses on the
design process, while the other three highlight the implementation process.
à Public participation in the project design process. To what degree did the
project design process involve informed participation by a range of or-
ganized low-income people, especially indigenous peoples and rural
women? Consultative meetings may have been held, but the input may
also have been ignored. This would be considered a `low' level of public
participation. `Medium to high' levels involve some degree of impact on
the policy process, such as the creation of power-sharing bodies to allo-
cate resources.
à Timely public access to information in the implementation process.Which
documents were available, when, to whom, in what language, and why?
If only the minimum English-language Bank documents mandated by
the public information disclosure policy were available, and only upon
request toWashington, then for the purposes of assessing the institutional
environmental for social capital consolidation, such projects would be
ranked `zero.' If such documents were available, still in English but in
country, then the ranking would be `low.' If no Bank documents were
available in country, but the key project information was made publicly
available in a government document in the main local language, the
ranking would be `medium.' If the government and/or the Bank made a
systematic e¡ort to translate and disseminate not only the basic docu-
ments but also ongoing project implementation information, the rating
would be `high.' These rankings are national.
This indicator is disaggregated, also including regional level informa-
tion about subprojects. Each of the ten large loans allocates funds to
numerous social, economic, and natural resource management subpro-
jects. To what degree are the criteria for allocating resources between and
within distinct subprojects explicit and public? Here, rankings focus on
179
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whether social organizations have access to local/regional level project
decision-making information.
à Institutional mechanisms for state-society cooperation over resource allo-
cation. Did the project, as designed, propose new institutional mechanisms
for sharing control between the state and representative civil organiza-
tions, especially indigenous and women's groups? If so, what were the
criteria for civil participation? To what degree were proposed institutions
actually created, and did they represent the full range of poor people's
organizations in the speci¢c region? Such power sharing rarely occurs at
the national level, and therefore this indicator is disaggregated in terms of
national and local levels, where state-society power sharing is more likely
to be permitted. If state-society councils were created that included the key
relevant social organizations but lacked actual authority over resource
allocation, their contribution to the environment for social capital con-
solidation might be considered `low-to-medium,' since their existence might
permit future e¡orts to gain authority over the process. If a majority were
inclusionary and had authority, such a project would rank `medium-to-
high,' or `high.' If there is a wide diversity of regional outcomes, such
projects could be ranked `low-high.'
à Intersectoral coalition building. Did policymakers make e¡orts to reach
out to form pro-poor social capital partnerships ^ with each other and/or
with civil society stakeholders? Timid and erratic e¡orts to form coali-
tions would be rated `zero-to-low.' Discreet and selective e¡orts would be
rated `medium.' More sustained, broader coalition-building e¡orts would
rate `medium-high' or `high.' One key indicator is whether World Bank
and/or government policymakers actually develop practical strategies
and invest their own political capital to o¡set resistance from anti-
participation factions embedded in both the Bank and the state.
Principal ¢ndings
The o¤cial goals of each project are summarized brie£y in Table 1, based on
their `founding'operational documents. The assessment of each project in terms
of the four main indicators is summarized inTable 2.The assessments are based
on review of o¤cial project documents and extensive interviews with World
Bank sta¡, national and local government o¤cials, and representatives of
grassroots stakeholder organizations.
Varied bargaining power among pro-reform actors drives varied social capital
outcomes
The most immediate ¢nding was the unevenness of outcomes across both
sectors and regions. Table 2 shows that while most projects did not put pro-
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participation discourse into practice, a signi¢cant minority took major strides
in that direction. Two projects where regional variation was studied in depth
revealed that even in some of the more promising cases, a wide range of di¡erent
local outcomes was the norm (Fox and Gershman, 1999). The patterns of
variation con¢rmed one of our hypotheses, namely that projects in which funds
were directed to implementing agencies dominated by pro-social capital policy-
makers performed better than those projects that did not. In three of the ten
projects (Protected Areas and Agrarian Reform Communities in the Philip-
pines and Community Forestry in Mexico), the projects directed funds toward
agencies that contained relatively powerful pro-poor project managers. These
were also the exceptional projects where Bank sta¡ played more in£uential
roles, speci¢cally going out of their way to build intersectoral social capital
with other reformists, within both the state and civil society.
While there was some variation across sectors, there was often as much
variation across geographic regions within the same projects. There were two
main reasons for these patterns: regional variation in the strength of scaled-
up social capital and regional variation in program managers'attitudes towards
autonomous organizations. In all the projects that actually underwent imple-
mentation, key institutional obstacles/opportunities were located in regional
constellations of power. That regional rural elites oppose power-sharing and
participation by the organized rural poor would be no surprise to reformers in
Mexico, the Philippines, or the World Bank; nevertheless, project managers in
both the Bank and the national governments tended to at most react to these
obstacles, rather than to develop proactive strategies that took them into ac-
count. In other words, the mixed results were in part the result of policymakers'
underinvestment in enabling institutional environments for social capital.
Ethnic and gender dimensions of social capital remain under-recognized
Only three of the ten projects paid sustained attention to either ethnic or gender
dimensions of social capital accumulation (one was mildly gender-sensitive in
the Philippines, and one in each country took ethnic di¡erences seriously into
account). Whereas the Integrated Protected Areas project paid some speci¢c
attention to the delineation of indigenous peoples' ancestral domain claims, the
design phases of the Community Based Resource Management and Social
Fund projects did not recognize that the organizational forms of social capital
in indigenous communities might di¡er from those in lowland Christian com-
munities. In the Protected Areas project, ¢eld interviews revealed that members
of indigenous communities found that the forms of legally recognized com-
munity organizations clashed with traditional forms of social organization and
authority structures. Some community organizers have recognized this and
have modi¢ed the methods of constructing organizational linkages for indige-
nous communities.
The Agrarian Reform Communities project was the only one that paid any
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attention to the gender dimension of social capital accumulation. Monitoring
indicators included data on women's membership and leadership roles in the
cooperatives. But in the overall design stage and community planning stage,
there was no particular attention paid to building the social capital of poor
women. In Mexico, none of the projects studied were informed by gender
perspectives. This follows the broader pattern in which World Bank gender
sensitivity is limited to seeing women as mothers, rather than as economic
actors as well (Buvenic, Gwin and Bates, 1996). Indeed, in at least one case in
Oaxaca, organized rural women engaged in militant direct action to press for
their right to be included in the program.
In terms of ethnicity, only one of the Mexico projects systematically pro-
moted partnerships that were respectful of the diverse indigenous producers'
organizations. In contrast to the Community Forestry project, Rural Develop-
ment in Marginal Areas appeared to be systematically either excluding or
bypassing the most consolidated indigenous producer organizations in its areas
of operation, according to ¢eld reports (Fox and Gershman, 1999). Federal
o¤cials blame state government counterparts for these problems, but the entire
project design is based on reinforcing state o¤cials' leverage. The project is still
in its early phases, and its outcome remains open-ended, but the national
elections in 2000 increased the incentives to politicize program operations ^
suggesting that, in the absence of new countermeasures, patterns of exclusion
can get worse before they get better.
Unpack the state to identify obstacles and opportunities to supporting enabling
environments
The original research design focused upon the three-way relationship between
the Bank, implementing government agencies, and civil society. The ¢eld results
suggest two important modi¢cations of this triangular relationship, both in-
volving further `unpacking' of the state (both horizontally and vertically). At
the national level, the cases highlight the important role played by the national
¢nancial intermediaries between the Bank and the national states (the Treasury
Ministry in Mexico and Departments of Budget and Management and Finance
in the Philippines). In both countries, the national legislatures lack e¡ective
oversight over the executive's resource allocation, which reinforces the autonomy
of the national ¢nancial authorities, which retain considerable leverage over
projects they fund. Even if the Finance Ministries are not the implementing
agencies, they can still act to inhibit or promote the enabling environments for
social capital accumulation.
The second way in which the national state needs to be institutionally
`unpacked' involves decentralization. This is the `vertical' dimension, in which
state and local governments gain responsibility for the implementation of na-
tional social and environmental policies. Local and/or provincial governments
played important roles in four of the Philippines projects (IPAS, ARC, Social
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Fund and CBRM) and in one of the Mexican cases (Rural Development in
Marginal Areas; see Fox and Aranda, 1996; Fox, 1996b; and Fox, 1999). In
none of the cases did decentralization ful¢ll its promise of bringing the govern-
ment closer to the people. Indeed, in those cases where notable pro-social
capital initiatives were documented, they consistently came from national
agencies dominated by reformist policymakers. While this does not suggest
that local governments have no contribution to o¡er, it appears that the chal-
lenges of local democratization and capacity-building are greater than many
policymakers have assumed.
Policy implications
These ¢ndings suggest four main implications for policymakers committed to
supporting enabling environments for pro-poor social capital. The ¢rst one
applies primarily to international development organizations, while the re-
mainder apply to domestic policymakers as well.
To reinforce an enabling policy environment for social capital, invest where the
reformers already are
This study's ¢ndings underscore the growing concern to target aid where it will
actually make a di¡erence. Our results concur with other recent ¢ndings by the
World Bank (1999) that foreign aid will make the greatest contribution where
the institutions and policies are `right.' But our research suggests that an
exclusive focus on the national level policies is limiting. The cases suggest that
local governments and distinct national agencies may be at least as relevant for
comparative analysis about what kinds of institutions `work.' Indeed, studies
that use nation-states as the only unit for cross-national analysis implicitly
treat them as institutionally homogeneous, which can direct policy attention
away from promising pro-reform enclaves. At least in the case of the natural
resource management and rural development projects examined here, it was the
variation in commitment to pro-social capital reforms within the state appara-
tus that explained the variation in enabling environments. The projects that
produced the most impressive results, in terms of encouraging an enabling
environment, were those that were targeted to state agencies already under the
control of pro-participation reformers (Environment in both countries and
Agrarian Reform in the Philippines).
Investing political capital during the project design phase is necessary
There is no unidirectional arrow between the design and implementation phases.
Projects can begin as participatory and then erode, as state actors unwilling to
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share power with civil society capture them (as occurred in the Rural Develop-
ment in Marginal Areas Project). In other words, a pro-poor project design
phase cannot inoculate projects against setbacks. The opponents of power-
sharing with poor people's organizations are likely to remain entrenched within
their own societies' states, civil societies, and the World Bank itself. Only the
sustained investment of political capital by allied pro-social capital actors in all
three arenas has a chance of keeping opponents in check. Since e¡orts to derail
participatory initiatives are to be expected, continuous monitoring is essential
to identify and o¡set those threats. This suggests that pro-participation projects
require signi¢cant investment of resources to encourage independent civil
monitoring mechanisms, to facilitate more sustained, bottom-up supervision
before opponents of participation gain the upper hand (Fox, 1997a).
Conversely, projects without much participation in the design phase can
sometimes improve their contribution, as in the case of the Philippine Agrarian
Reform Communities project, where new national policymakers encouraged
participatory partnerships. Similarly, changes in the Philippine Protected Areas
project at the midterm review enabled pro-participatory dimensions of the
project to gain more attention under a new task manager. While the institu-
tional dynamics of project loans are usually path-dependent, these examples
suggest that if new Bank or borrowing country implementing agency sta¡ come
into a project after the design stage, a willingness to invest in intersectoral
social capital can create new room for maneuver.
Building pro-poor social capital often threatens vested interests, so institutions
and coalitions must expect con£ict
Con£ict can be a crucible for bolstering pro-poor social capital. Social capital
is often discussed in ways that emphasize shared norms and negotiated, con-
sensual understandings. These dimensions focus on the degree of agreement
among those who share social capital, and sidestep the often controversial
process of coming together to engage in collective action in defense of the
excluded. Indeed, the promotion of organized poor people's participation and
creation of transparent, accountable public institutions will inherently be contro-
versial, because these processes involve redistributing power. The ten case studies
examined here support the study's initial proposition that the consolidation of
social capital is indeed controversial, and therefore some degree of con£ict may
often be required to pursue pro-social capital institutional reforms. In all cases
where serious reform was attempted, con£ict ensued ^ either within the state or
between state and social actors.
Pro-social capital strategies need to identify and work to weaken, sidestep
or neutralize those obstacles from the beginning, launching the `virtuous circles'
(Putnam, 1993) that promote social capital accumulation (Fox, 1996b). Other-
wise, pro-social capital forces will be caught in the nearly inevitable backlash
and will be forced continuously to ¢ght defensive battles, focusing primarily on
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minimizing losses rather than maximizing gains. It is here where Bank sta¡ can
act to strengthen the intersectoral social capital of pro-poor state reformists
and can assist in overcoming the isolation that many reformers feel, by provid-
ing venues for them to build the kind of esprit de corps that macroeconomic
technocrats are identi¢ed as having. One example of such a process can be seen
in the Philippines, where the Bank's newly appointed sector chief on rural
development has tried to build intersectoral social capital among government
sta¡ involved in natural resource management projects. In terms of policy
implications, the lesson here is that con£ict should be seen as a likely and
perhaps necessary outcome, to be foreseen by creative institutional design and
managed by the investment of political capital, rather than treated as an im-
plicitly unusual outcome and dealt with through ad hoc after-the-fact damage
control measures.
Social capital is unevenly distributed, requiring di¡erentiated support strategies
The fourth policy implication involves civil society, and the challenge of how
policies can take into account variation in the distribution of social capital
across groups, sectors, and regions. No one-size-¢ts-all strategy for social
capital promotion is likely to work (though certain institutional conditions ^
such as freedom of association and timely public access to information ^ are
critical). In order to e¡ectively mobilize social capital as a policy resource to
empower the poor, investment strategies need to be di¡erentiated according to
the level and nature of existing forms of social capital, especially where gender
and ethnic di¡erences are involved. This may mean concentrating resources in
areas or sectors where potential civil partners are strong, at the expense of
those where they are weak. Alternatively, one could propose greater up-front
investments in capacity building before assuming that other kinds of invest-
ment will work. Development projects are most likely to be able to tap and
encourage social capital if their strategies recognize its diverse organizational
forms and scale. In short, if development investments are to tap social capital,
they must be understood as institutional change strategies.
Social capital as a policy resource
Did social capital become a resource that could be harnessed to meet other
objectives of policymakers? Only three of the ten cases had a signi¢cant pro-
poor impact among bene¢ciaries of projects and thus could contribute to the
accumulation of scaled-up or intersectoral social capital: ARCs and Protected
Areas in the Philippines and Community Forestry in Mexico. These cases
demonstrated the underlying importance of reformist policymakers investing
their own political capital if social capital were to be successfully generated in a
form that could be deployed as a policy resource.
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Most of the case studies found that project managers either ignored or were
hostile to existing forms of pro-poor social capital. In both Rural Finance
projects, policymakers chose to attempt to strengthen private commercial
banks rather than community-based ¢nancial organizations. Under the design
of the Rainfed Areas Project, producers were to present their applications in
organized groups (World Bank, 1994, p. 13). However, no institutional mecha-
nism for coordination with the producer organizations was created in practice
(Adelson, 1999).
The three cases where some signi¢cant resource was created out of social
capital all occurred in projects that consolidated existing levels of horizontal
pro-poor social capital, and left medium-to-high levels of intersectoral social
capital.
In these three cases the social capital spilled over into other policymaking
functions. For example, in the ARC project, the planning process used to develop
a development plan for the ARC led to a two-month process of joint planning
by government o¤cials and CBO leaders, including barangay (village) consul-
tation to produce workshops, household surveys, and focus group discussions
(the latter involving farmer leaders). In cases where local government o¤cials
supported strengthening the accumulation of pro-poor social capital, the plans
developed through this process were incorporated into barangay and municipal
development plans. In some cases, this led to immediate commitments on the
part of local o¤cials to meet community needs in areas not covered by the
project.
In the Community Forestry case, the accumulation of social capital occurred
in the face of opposition from the Treasury Ministry and parts of the Environ-
ment Ministry itself.World Bank project sta¡ have been consistently supportive
of their Mexican project manager colleagues in internal debates with Treasury
and other Environment Ministry o¤cials, however. These challenges to imple-
mentation of the potential suggest that the combination of broad-based hori-
zontal social capital with diversi¢ed intersectoral social capital is necessary but
not su¤cient to insure the accumulation of pro-poor social capital. Pro-poor
coalitions must also mobilize their political capital to o¡set opposition inherent
in the process of encouraging the empowerment of poor peoples'organizations.
The importance of sustained investment of political capital by policymakers
in order to prevent the consumption of intersectoral social capital is provided
by a ¢nal example. This example requires mentioning that there is some con-
fusion in the social capital literature over whether trust is an element of social
capital, built into its de¢nition (norms and relationships), a factor that encour-
ages social capital, or the result of social capital. For this reason, the de¢nition
used here leaves norms out, and is instead limited to relationships. Con£ating
norms and networks under the same conceptual umbrella makes it di¤cult to
understand causal £ows: is trust generated by relationships, or do relationships
generate trust? The process is often reciprocal, but it may also be path-depend-
ent, in which case it would matter whether the chicken or the egg came ¢rst.
For example, where trust is lacking, then relationships must be built that can
187
[413]
justify trust. This is an issue for those attempting to build intersectoral social
capital under less than democratic conditions, where, based on past experience,
state actors are not widely perceived as pluralistic or motivated by the public
interest.
From the point of view of autonomous membership organizations (the very
embodiment of horizontal poor people's social capital), the reaction to the
promise of participatory inclusion in the policy process is often one of rational
wariness. As a result, development policies that attempt to encourage an en-
abling environment for intersectoral partnerships face a problem of strategic
interaction. Pro-participation policymakers often start out relatively weak,
having limited leverage over the rest of the state apparatus; therefore they need
social actors to mobilize in support of their e¡orts. Yet those actors may be
quite skeptical about whether to invest in untried schemes for change. This is
where the subjective factor of trust becomes relevant: for a mutually reinforcing
coalition to emerge, each potential partner must make an investment with a
high degree of uncertainty regarding the commitment, capacity, and intentions
of their potential partner.
The Rural Development in Marginal Areas experience in Mexico is espe-
cially revealing of the central role of trust in the building of intersectoral social
capital. The case began with an unusual degree of communication and trust
between the initial World Bank project manager and key social organizations
and NGOs in the relatively densely organized state of Oaxaca. After the key
Bank manager moved elsewhere and the project design process rejected key
civil society recommendations, years passed before the project itself was
launched. Even after the loan was signed, funding £ows trickled. The intersec-
toral social capital accumulated during project preparation was consumed
rather than invested.
This experience suggests a possibly generalizable dynamic ^ a vicious circle
of unmet expectations that might describe why some participatory projects
start o¡ well but then lose their momentum, after failing to nourish community
commitment. To understand this pattern, one needs to assess the strategic
calculus of the key subjects of the development process. Broad-based autono-
mous producer organizations that have emerged in less-than-democratic envi-
ronments may choose not to invest their scarce human resources and political
capital in ostensibly participatory development programs because they expect
little or no return to their investment. Based on their past experiences with
rural development programs, producer organizations are often well informed
about which kinds of government programs are likely to respect their autonomy
and to deliver what they promise. Leaders who are accountable to their base
will be especially sensitive to the risks associated with raising their members'
expectations about outside government programs. This rational wariness under-
scores that it is critical for government and Bank o¤cials to take tangible
measures designed speci¢cally to generate trust and to make commitments
only when they can ultimately comply with them.
If, because of a target population's rational wariness, only a few broad-
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based organizations choose to participate in an external government program,
then the perverse e¡ect will deprive pro-participation elements of the organized
constituency they would need to o¡set likely opposition from other actors in
the state (and even in the Bank). As a result, program managers will be less
able to deliver on their promises to the few organizations that do choose to
participate, further eroding the prospects of developing intersectoral social
capital. At the same time, organizations that have decided not to participate
will see their rational wariness vindicated, in turn raising the minimum thresh-
old policymakers will need to establish the credibility required for future com-
mitments. In most cases, we conclude, the intersectoral potential of social
capital as a resource for policy reform requires investment both to generate
and sustain state-society partnerships.
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